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It has been my great good fortune to teach the history of European integration at University 
College Cork for over 25 years. I have also had the very good luck to work in archives in different 
countries in Europe and in the United States. I have also had the opportunity work with historian 
pioneers researching the origins and development of the European Union, that unique political 
construction and pioneer of pooled sovereignty. 
In my lifetime, I have seen the European Economic Community (EEC) grow from the original 
six in 1956 to nine in 1973 with the admission of Ireland, Denmark and Britain, and on, in the 
wake of the ending of the Cold War, to 28 member states. 
In that time, the community has changed its name as it has evolved towards ever closer union 
from Economic Coal and Steel Community to EEC, and then European Community and now the 
European Union. Whatever it has been called, the now European Union has been credited with 
having given Western Europe a prolonged period of unprecedented peace, breaking the cycle of 
world wars –helped turn swords into ploughshares and integrate the economies of the union. 
Ironically, paradoxically and surprisingly, the European Union has been led –since its inception– 
by a Franco-German axis, or better said, alliance. Both countries fought on opposite sides in the 
Franco-Prussian war of the 1870s, and in two world wars in the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, both countries navigated the European Union through the ending of the Cold 
War and its aftermath of civil unrest and civil war in the former Yugoslavia and neighbouring 
territories. The fall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European empire provided the 
unprecedented opportunity for the European Union to extend its parameters to the boundaries 
of a retracted Russian influence. By 2014, there were 28 member states and that is likely to remain 
static for a number of years as there are major problems with the country at the top of the queue... 
Turkey. 
Not surprisingly, the leaders of the movement for European integration post-World War II 
were active in the resistance or were political opponents of Fascism and Nazism. In the 1930s 
and during the war years, many of the men and women who shaped the future of Europe, in the 
late 1940s and 1950s, had witnessed the collapse of the nation state on the continent, experienced 
a disastrous war and, most disconcertingly, saw elites in the occupied states placing governing 
apparatus in the hands of pro-Hitler puppet regimes. Moreover, those quisling-like regimes 
collaborated willingly with the plans of the Nazis to eliminate the Jews, gypsies, gay people, 
and anyone who stood in their way. As early as July 1941, the Italian federalist, Altiero Spinelli, 
helped produce the Manifest of Ventotene in which it was written that 
the nation has become a divine entity which thinks only of its own existence and 
its own development, without caring at all about the damage it may cause to others. 
The absolute sovereignty of the nation states has caused each one of them to try to 
dominate the other. The inevitable result of this desire to dominate is the hegemony 
of the strongest state over all the others. 
The doctrine of nationalism, in those circumstances, provided an opportunity to return to old 
ways. The solution was to replace autarchy with a European federation and drive out forever 
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the forces of National Socialism and Fascism by creating supra-national structures governing a 
United States of Europe. 
Altiero Spinelli, the anti-fascist resistance leader in Italy favoured a federal solution in post- 
war Europe. At a meeting in Geneva in 1944, which was attended by Spinelli, the same message 
emerged: 
 
If a post war order is established in which each State retains its complete national 
sovereignty, the basis for a Third World War would still exist even after the Nazi 
attempt to establish the domination of the German race in Europe has been frustrated. 
 
What further reinforced strong sentiments of that kind for people like Spinelli was the manner 
and methods by which the Nazis had sought to conduct a policy of genocide against Jews and 
other groups of so-called untermenschen, those with physical and mental disabilities, gypsies and 
gays. 
On 16 October 1943, over 1,000 Italian Jews were rounded up and transported to Auschwitz 
as were over 4,000 others from Northern Italy. Add to that the millions who were exterminated 
in the death camps from all over Europe and it is not difficult to see why there was a great 
resolve amongst those who experienced the evils of Nazism and Fascism never to return to the 
international anarchy of the inter-war years when the League of Nations was neither respected 
nor obeyed by German and Italy. 
Another great Italian, the author, Carlo Levi, was a strong voice against Fascism and wrote 
a memorable work, Christ Stopped at Eboli, which was an implicit condemnation of the Italian 
regime and an act of defiance in literature. 
His namesake, novelist and poet Primo Levi, was a holocaust survivor and he has left many 
haunting lines –in prose and in verse– which raged against the unimaginable tyranny of the 
Holocaust. In his poem, Schemà, Levi writes: 
Consider whether this is a man 
Who labours in the mud 
Who knows no peace 
Who fights for a crust of bread 
Who dies at a yes or a no. 
Consider whether this is a woman, 
Without hair or name 
With no more strength to remember 
Eyes empty and womb cold 
As a frog in winter 
 
His fellow poet, Paul Celan, –another survivor of the holocaust– has left us these lines from 
the poem called todesfuge, originally called todestango. (It is hard to grasp the perverse truth that 
the orchestra at Auschwitz also had tangos in its repertoir.) Whatever its original name, today the 
poem, Deathfuge, should never be expunged from the collective global memory: 
Black milk of daybreak we drink it at evening 
We drink it at midday and morning we drink it at night 
We drink and we drink 
We shovel a grave in the air where you won’t lie too cramped 
 
Post World War II, continental politicians and civic leaders –who had experienced the horrors 
of the Nazi occupation and the Holocaust– worked with urgency to transform European political 
and economic structures and prevent a return to the post-Versailles international system which 
had collapsed in the 1930s. Europe in 1945 had a number of outstanding and like-minded political 
leaders willing to end inter-state conflict and rivalry and, influenced by progressive political 
thinking influenced heavily by Catholic social teaching, drive on towards the establishment of 
a United State of Europe based on the principles of the welfare state. The four most important 
leaders were Alcide De Gasperi of Italy, Robert Schumann of France, Konrad Adenauer of 
Germany, and the French civil servant and architect of a united Europe, Jean Monnet. Without 





labouring the point, the European structures to emerge between 1948 and 1955 were based on 
the principles of pooled sovereignty, first exemplified in the structures of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (1951) and later by the European Economic Community (1957). The six original 
members, France, Germany and Italy, together with the Benelux (Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Belgium) had little difficulty adjusting to the idea of pooled sovereignty in key sectors. None were 
idolaters of the nation state. All enjoyed the full benefits of the free movement of goods, labour 
and capital. While not losing their respective national identities, citizens in all six countries were 
encouraged to cultivate their European identity. After all, the EEC was evolving towards a full 
political and economic union, and ultimately a United States of Europe. 
It is not historically accurate to say that “the nation state” was totally discredited, or discredited 
in every way, by the war. The British, the Irish and the Scandinavians –Norway apart– were 
countries which had not experienced occupation. Britain stood up valiantly to Hitler. Ireland 
was neutral as was also Sweden (Spain and Portugal were not democracies.) In the unoccupied 
democracies, the nation state was not a spent and discredited institution. On the contrary, the 
opposite lesson was taken from the war; the nation state was, for example, what was perceived to 
have saved Ireland from invasion. 
Eamon de Valera, the wartime leader, remained in power until 1948. He was, in the early 
post-war period, an enthusiastic supporter of integration for continental Europeans. But he did 
not see it as being immediately relevant for Ireland, or, at least, not at that point of departure in 
1948/9. Winston Churchill, the great wartime leader, was put out of office in 1945. He remained 
strongly supportive of economic cooperation but not pooled sovereignty or federalism. Both 
the British and the Irish –for very different reasons– showed no inclination to join the Coal and 
Steel Community in 1951 or the EEC in 1957. But, by 1961, both had changed their respective 
policies and knocked on the door in Brussels to petition for membership, together with Denmark 
and Norway. There was never any doubt about the terms on which the British entered the EEC; 
London wanted EEC membership but for reasons of enlightened self-interest. The British wanted 
to mould the future of the community to its own image and likeness, pre-empting the emergence 
of a federal Europe or a united Europe. At this point, Scotland and Wales were not in a position 
to have a direct say in the decision to join, other than through their strong Labour representation 
in the Commons. Ireland, on the other hand, quickly learned the harsh realities of being a small 
power and a neutral. The Irish leader, Seán Lemass, made it clear in mid-1962 that Ireland was 
prepared to join a community heading towards ultimate political union. None of the applicants 
succeeded in that round. President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the membership of the British in 
January 1963. There was another flurry to obtain membership in 1967. But the British, the Irish 
and the Danes had to wait until 1 January1973 to secure membership. 
Thirdly, the EC had to confront the challenge from the British seeking to derail any effort to 
move towards federalism and social democratic influences. 
Unlike Ireland where a referendum on membership of the EC was held in 1972 with a 91% “yes” 
outcome, the British did not get an opportunity to do the same. The new Labour Government of 
Harold Wilson called a referendum in 1975, 67.23% said “yes” to the question “Do you think the 
United Kingdom should stay in the European Economic Community (Common Market)?” The 
strength of the “yes” vote was all the more remarkable because of the split within the cabinet. 
Ministers canvassed on both sides. Many Conservatives would also have voted to remain in the 
EC. 
The next enlargement brought in three countries which had emerged relatively recently 
from military dictatorship. Greece, ruled by the colonels between 1967 and 1974, joined in 1981. 
Spain, following the death of Franco in 1975, had successfully made the transition to democracy. 
Portugal, following the coup in 1974, had followed a similar path. Both joined on 1 January 1986. 
I will make three observations here. Firstly, the arrival of all three countries into the community 
was seen as a way of making the democratic process in each country irreversible or, at least, 
strengthening democratic institutions. Secondly, the larger the membership of the community 
became the greater the danger of losing sight of the original objectives. Widening jeopardised the 
deepening process. 
The British Prime Minister between 1979 and 1990, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, was first and 





foremost an English nationalist. She conducted a successful campaign during her first years in 
power to have the EC adjust Britain’s VAT repayment to Brussels. “I want my money back,” she 
demanded, and she got it to the eternal shame of the other member states. 
But she had more of a struggle after 1985 with the new President of the Commission, Jacques 
Delors. The latter gave a new momentum to the process of European integration, completing the 
internal market and laying the foundations for a single European currency. He saw through the 
Single European Act in 1986 and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Delors was there for the fall of 
the Berlin wall and for the accession in 1995of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the community. 
Delors’ nemesis was Mrs Thatcher. She was, first and foremost, an English nationalist. She 
conducted a successful campaign during her first years in power to have the EC adjust Britain’s 
VAT repayment to Brussels. “I want my money back,” she demanded, and she got it. In 1988, 
Thatcher’s Euroscepticism was at its most pronounced in a speech in the College of Europe, 
Bruges. 
She said that “working more closely together does not require power to be centralised 
in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.” She said her first guiding 
principle was that willing and “active cooperation between independent sovereign states” was 
“the best way to build a successful European Community.” To try to suppress nationhood and 
concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and 
wold jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve. 
She wanted France as France, Spain as Spain and Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, 
traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European 
personality. “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see 
them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance 
from Brussels,” Thatcher declared. 
When Delors called for the European Parliament to be the democratic body of the community, 
the commission to be the executive and the Council of Ministers to be the Senate, Thatcher told 
the Commons in reply in 1990: “No, No, No.” 
In her book Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World, Thatcher wrote in 2003 that “such an 
unnecessary and irrational project as building a European super state was ever embarked upon 
will seem in future years to be perhaps the greatest folly of the modern era.” 
But in the end, her extreme views on Europe contributed to her fall from power on 28 November 
1990. However, free of the burdens of office, she was even more frank with her biographer, 
Charles Moore, who argued that she wanted Britain to leave the EC following the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992: “Advisers had persuaded her that she should not say this in public 
since it would have allowed her opponents to drive her to the fringes of public life.” She did not 
really care too much about what was thought of her on this topic. 
Delors, in contrast, gave a new momentum to the process of European integration, completing 
the internal market and laying the foundations for a single European currency. He saw through 
the Single European Act in 1986 and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Delors was there for the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and for the accession in 1995 of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The popular 
press in Britain, known as the red tops, had a field day at the expense of Delors. These slides show 
his unpopularity. Building on the success of Delors, who stepped down as President in 1996, his 
successors helped bring about the introduction of the Euro in 2001/2 –perhaps the single most 
important driver of further European integration and the pooling of sovereignty in the area of 
banking and fiscal control. Some 19 of the 28 countries are now members in a Europe that has 
spread from the west to deep into the east. But as the introduction of the Euro has demonstrated, 
the European Union has deepened as well as widening in recent years. The prevalence and 
persistence of international financial crises has helped to deepen further the integration process. 
Ireland, which confronted a major financial melt-down in 2008, witnessed at first hand that 
rescue packages came at a severe price –not merely in terms of imposing rigidities and austerity 
on Irish people, but also by forcing– as part of a recovery package –Ireland to undertake reform 
of banking, business and government reform. Pension were cut, wage increases frozen, the civil 
service was down-sized, recruitment to the public service was prohibited. Just as EEC membership 
had obliged Ireland to introduce equal pay for women in the mid-1970s, so, too, were Irish 





governments obliged –as a consequence of the crisis– to introduce such unpopular measures as 
property tax, charges for water and salary cuts. Such swingeing measures were unpopular and 
the backlash helped bring down Fianna Fáil and their Green Party coalition partners in 2011. But 
the measures worked, as the Irish economy in 2015 is growing at the rate of 6.5%. 
Why were the Irish so passive in the face of such unprecedented cutbacks in the standard 
of living for so many people? The answer is that they were not and the change of government 
in 2011 demonstrated that they were far from being passive or fatalistic. Perhaps one of the 
reasons why the Irish public had not collectively targeted the European Union for its woes, is that 
reasonable citizens knew that the economic crisis following the departure of the Celtic Tiger was 
substantially home-made and home-grown. Membership of the EU provided a way for the Irish 
economy to recover while local politicians could blame Brussels for having to introduce property 
tax and water charges. Another reason why Irish citizens have not simply blamed Europe for its 
woes is because membership of the European Union in Ireland is rooted in the sovereign will 
of the people expressed on many occasions in referenda through the ballot box when Ireland 
first sought to join on 8 June 1972 and then on every occasion when there was a major change 
to the Treaty: Single European Act, 26 May 1987; European Union (Maastricht), 16 June 1992; 
Amsterdam, 3 June 1998; Nice 1 and 2, 7 June 2001, and 19 October 2002; Lisbon, 12 June 2008 
(rejected), and 2 October 2009 (accepted); Fiscal Treaty (2012). 
However unpopular the EU might be in Ireland today –with a revolt over water charges, 
dissent over austerity and the emergence of the strongest ever showing for independents in 
the opinion polls, at 31%– it cannot be argued convincingly that the Ireland’s relationship with 
an ever-evolving EU is not rooted in democratic choice and popular sovereignty. But there is a 
growing scepticism over the future of the European project. It has strayed a far distance from the 
idealism of the late 1940s and early 1950s. There is a real danger that that idealism, which sought 
to guarantee no return to the destructive nationalism of the 1930s, has been replaced in part by 
a European project based on defence of the status quo. The humanitarianism which drove people 
like Altiero Spinelli, Alcide de Gasperi, Robert Schumann and Konrad Adenauer is no longer 
the main driver of the community. At least, that humanitarian legacy is in conflict with more 
conservative forces which wish to reduce the European Union to a coalition of nation states –and 
not a union in the true sense of that word. That was the vision of Charles de Gaulle –a Europe 
led by France without the presence of a pro-US Britain. In an extreme form, those nationalist 
sentiments are echoed by Marine Le Pen and her French National Front Party. On 22 April 2012, 
she polled 17.90%, or six million votes, in the first round of the presidential election. Unlikely to 
succeed in the next presidential election, she will certainly increase her vote. There are echoes of 
similar rightist sentiments in Italy particularly as represented by the Lega Nord in the northern 
part of Italy where the league is the largest part in the Veneto and Lombardy, and the second 
largest in Emilia Romagna and Tuscany, the third largest in Liguria, Marche and Umbria and the 
fourth largest in Piedmont. But for all the huffing and puffing, the league is unlikely to takeover 
national government in Italy, no more than Le Pen in France or the far right in Germany where 
the centre is deeply entrenched. But that does not mean that there ought to be any complacency in 
the European Union. The far right is a growing threat and its presence requires eternal vigilance 
in Belgium and in the Netherlands, in Spain, Portugal, Austria and Greece. Casting a swift eye 
over the former communist bloc countries, now members of the EU, Poland and Hungary have 
worrying groups of extreme nationalists. Although it would be alarmist to suggest that those 
forces collectively might dislodge the moderate centre of political gravity at the core of the EU, 
those parties are far from being an irrelevance in international politics. Madame Le Pen’s party 
won 23 seats in the last European Parliament Elections. She helped form a new far right group 
in the European Parliament known as Europe of Nations and Freedoms which will have at least 
36 members. The National Front, Austria’s Freedom Party, Italy’s Northern League, the Belgian 
Flemish Interest Party, the Dutch Party of Freedom, and the far right Polish Party as well as a former 
British member of the United Kingdom Independence Party. Le Pen has refused admission to 
Greece’s Golden Dawn and the Hungarian Jobbik Party which has made anti-semitic statements. 
While the practical impact of Madame Le Pen’s new grouping is likely to have limited impact, 
the organisation of the far right in the European Parliament is a new departure and it shows 





greater and growing cohesion between parties of the right in Europe. In a 751-member parliament, 
this new right grouping is not likely to sway many votes. The Christian Democrats have 221 seats 
and the Socialists 191. But their populist rhetoric and easy solutions for dealing with increasing 
numbers of emigrants, migrants and refugees reaching the shores of southern Europe will gain 
momentum. But the voice of radical, far right nationalism in Europe today is far from being the 
threat that it constituted in Europe in the 1930s with the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. 
The danger in the contemporary context is that the policies of austerity imposed on wayward 
countries like Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, etc. feeds latent nationalist sentiment and 
helps the recruiting drives of the radical right in many European countries. So, whenever there 
is economic austerity, perceived to be imposed by Brussels, by the European Central Bank and 
by the IMF, xenophobia and anti-semitism rises as does also anti-Islam fervour. In Hungary, for 
example, the right-wing government has a long-standing claim for the retrieval of “their” land 
held by the Rumanians and other countries. There is an opposition party in Hungary even further 
to the right of the current government. When austerity measures were imposed in Hungary, 
irredentist claims for a lost territory became more pronounced. Without wishing to repeat myself, 
the far-right benefits politically from austerity policies perceived to be imposed by outside 
institutions. The cry soon goes up that Jewish bankers are behind the economic oppression of 
whatever country faces the acute need to reform rapidly and radically. 
Judging by the jingoistic popular press in Britain, which is very hostile to the European 
Union and to British membership of the EC, their sustained attacks on Brussels and on European 
centralisation, may give cause for concern. The British Prime Minister, James Cameron, had 
pledged to renegotiate Britain’s terms of membership of the EU and to put the issue of membership 
before the electorate. But if there were a real danger of a British exit, Brexit, from the EU, one 
might have expected the UKIP party of Nigel Farage to have done better in the recent British 
General Election. They got two seats in the unforgiving first past the post system where their 
candidates sometimes polled twenty and thirty per cent of the popular vote. Will Cameron win 
a referendum to keep Britain inside the EU? There has not been such a referendum since 1975. 
So, the British Prime minister is in uncharted waters. Or is he? A rampant Scottish Nationalist 
Party (SNP) won 56 of the 59 seats, wiping out the Labour Party in Scotland. The SNP is pro-EU, 
but not necessarily as part of the UK. The Liberal Democrats, reduced from 57 to eight seats, is 
also pro EU. The Labour Party, dropped 26 seats to hold a mere 232 seats to the Conservative 
Party’s 330 seats, a gain of 24. On these figures, even if the Conservative and Labour Parties have 
a large share of Euro-sceptics, Cameron should win a referendum on continued membership 
of the EU. His difficulty is that he needs to be able to show to the electorate that he has got 
substantial concessions from Brussels in the autumn of this year. That is highly unlikely. He will 
not reproduce the “triumph” of Margaret Thatcher in the mid-1980s when she banged the table 
until she got her way. Cameron will have to face a British electorate without much to show for 
his efforts. He brings with him to the fight his pro-business and pro-EU convictions. Rationally, 
Britain must choose –out of national self-interest– to remain in the EU. But a referendum is a Yes 
or a No. The distortions in results guaranteed by the first past the post system in a general election 
does not obtain in this contest. 
Finally, this brings me to a crisis which may well ignite anti-immigrant sentiments in 
Britain and have a distorting influence on the forthcoming referendum vote on Europe. The 
press photographs and TV reports on the blockading of the Calais train tunnel have received 
widespread coverage in Europe. Tourists and lorry drivers have been inconvenienced by the 
growing numbers of immigrants/migrants/refugees from sub-Saharan Africa, from Eretria, Syria 
and other countries which have begun to move en masse across the Mediterranean on the most 
makeshift boats –the pawns/victims of people traffickers and organised crime. 
To say it is a humanitarian crisis on an unprecedented scale is to know little about the history 
of displacement in the twentieth-century world. But it is certainly a migration unexperienced in 
Europe since the 1880s and 1890s when there was a great surge from the east of people fleeing 
religious and political persecution. They came in their thousands as political refugees and 
economic migrants seeking a better way of life in a part of the world known to be prosperous and 
tolerant in the main. Now, over one hundred years later, there is an even greater migration surge 





reaching the southern shores of Europe to Italy, Greece and Spain in the first instance. This new 
wave of migration will test the progressive, humanist and shared religious and political values of 
tolerance on which the European Union was founded –born as it was out of the embers of fascism, 
Nazism and dictatorships. 
Ireland has agreed to take about 600 Syrian and Eritrean refugees. Other countries have been 
more generous. But the numbers to be accommodated now is in the tens of thousands. The EU 
response has been severely criticised by the President of Ireland, Michael D. Higgins. But burden 
sharing in countries, some of which have experienced the rigours of austerity over the past few 
years, will prove hard to persuade their respective electorates to accept that the admission of 
large numbers of refugees is just and justifiable. 
Memory and, more and more, political education may govern the response to this new 
humanitarian crisis by the EU. But it is all too easy for governments and citizens alike to suffer 
from historical amnesia at this time of crisis. Of course, austerity has fanned the flames of radical 
nationalism and xenophobia in Europe. This will produce ugly echoes of an intolerant and 
authoritarian past within some EU countries. But it is unlikely that a growing current of strong 
economic nationalism will result in mainstream xenophobia or racism. Many countries will 
confront a rise of the radical right. But that is not likely to dominate the politics of the majority 
of European countries. But the containment of the radical right is not helped by a European 
Union which appears to perform like a group of beleaguered bankers and businessmen than 
as the inheritors of a project rooted in the xenophobic nationalism, the racism, the Nazism and 
the military authoritarianism of the 1930s. The European project was born out of a collective 
determination to say “never again” or “nunca más,” to the racism that begot the militarism that in 
turn begot the Holocaust. 
That is why the contemporary policies of the European Union will be all the stronger and 
enlightened if European political leaders educate themselves in the history of their continent and 
never allow the memory of what happened under Fascism and Nazism to stray from the forefront 
of their minds. The slogan on the banner, carried in Rome to commemorate the Nazi deportation 
of Jews from that city on 16 October 1943, captures a great truth: “Non c’é future senza memoria”, 
there is no future without memory. 
The poet Primo Levi records this same truth in the final stanza of his poem “For Adolf 
Eichmann”: 
 
O son of death, we do not wish you death 
May you live longer than anyone ever lived. 
May you live sleepless five million nights 
Any may you be visited each night by the suffering of everyone who saw, 
Shutting behind him, the door that blocked the way back, 
Saw it grow dark around him, the air fill with death. 
 
The Irish government agreed in 2015 to receive 4,000 refugees. Some 2,622 were to come 
from Italy and Greece, where most of those fleeing war in Syria in particular are resident. At 
the beginning of November 2016, just 69 from Italy and Greece have been relocated in Ireland, 
according to the Department of Justice as quoted by the Irish Examiner columnist, Michael 
Clifford. 
In this regard, the Irish government faces many unanswered questions: 
 
• Why is there no apparent sense of urgency in Irish government circles regarding this 
humanitarian disaster? 
• Why is there a delay in bringing refugees to the country? 
• If Germany took roughly one million refugees last year, why cannot Ireland live up to its 
public commitment to receive the remaining 3,931 of the 4,000 it promised to take in 2015? 
 
 
 
